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Franke: Does Title VII Contemplate Personal Liability for Employee/Agent

DOES TITLE VII CONTEMPLATE PERSONAL
LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYEE/AGENT
DEFENDANTS?
Janice R. Franke-

INTRODUCTION

There has always been disagreement among the federal courts
as to whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII')' contemplates personal liability for individual defendants who
participate in discriminatory job actions while acting as agents of
the employing entity.2 Much of the disagreement stems from a
lack of clear guidance regarding legislative intent. The confusion
stems from the use of vague and general language in the statute's
remedy section3 as well as the lack of legislative history regarding
the remedial scheme adopted, particularly in light of the "on floor"
amendments shifting the enforcement focus of the statute.4 Since
Congress enacted the 1991 amendments directly authorizing the
award of tort-like compensatory and punitive damages in cases of
intentional discrimination,5 this issue has taken on a new dimension. This article reviews the legislative development of Title VII
and the courts' treatment of the issue of personal liability under the
statute, noting relevant comparisons to other labor and anti-discrimination laws. In doing so, it urges that individual liability is appropriate given considerations of both law and policy.

*

Assistant Professor of Business Law, College of Business, Ohio State University;

B.A., Smith College; J.D., Ohio State University.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 62-79. See also Christopher Greer, Note, "Who
Me?": A Supervisor's Individual Liability for Discrimination in the Workplace, 62 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1835 (1994); Phillip L. Lamberson, Personal Liability for Violations of Title V1I:
Thirty Years of Indecision, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 419 (1994).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
4. See Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII
Back Pay Remedy, 41 HAsTINGs LJ. 1301, 1314-17 (1990); Comment, Enforcement of Fair
Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. Ctm. L. REv. 430, 432-33, 466
(1965) [hereinafter FairEmployment].
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
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I. THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF TITLE VII
The passage of Title VII, as part of the broad-based Civil
Rights Act of 1964,6 was the culmination of a long series of efforts in Congress to pass some sort of fair employment legislation.7 While a major impetus for this legislation was the goal of
improving the social and economic position of Blacks by ensuring
to all full opportunity to participate in the workforce,8 strong concerns about the impact of government intrusion into business operations profoundly shaped the legislative process.9 As a result, Congress accepted significant revisions to Title VII in order to facilitate the passage of other provisions of the civil rights legislation.'0
These changes, particularly those relating to the Act's enforcement
mechanism, resulted from last-minute compromises made on the
floor of the chamber. 1 They altered the focus of Title VII from a
"public right," to be enforced largely through the efforts of an
administrative agency with strong powers, to a "private right," to
be vindicated mainly through individual lawsuits. 2 One pitfall of
the compromise frenzy was that the remedial section of the statute,
originally written to provide for judicial relief incidental to central
agency enforcement, was adopted without further conference or

6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et
seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The purpose of the original act was:
To enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district
courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in
public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the
Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other
purposes.
Id.

7. See Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1315.
8.

See Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1113 (1971) [hereinafter Employment Discrimination]. It was noted
that President Kennedy thought that legislation was needed because the plight of black Americans was so severe that threats of civil unrest mandated a reversal of the status quo. Id. at
n.2.
9. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. H1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); 110 CONo. REc.
H1604 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Selden); see also 118 CONG. REC. S671 (1972) (remarks of
Sen. Gambrell); 137 CONG. REC. H3040 (daily ed. May 15, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Paxon);
137 CONG. REC. H3808 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Ireland).
10. See Fair Employment, supra note 4, at 432.
11.
12.

See Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1315.
See Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1315-16.
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significant debate. 3
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 14 provided a
model for the initial versions of Title VII. 5 Like the NLRA, congressional authority for the enactment of Title VII was derived
from the Commerce Clause. 6 Thus, the scope of Title VIl's provisions is constitutionally limited to the regulation of those activities of private employers that have an impact on interstate commerce.'7 For example, the original definition of covered employers
under Title VII included an exemption for entities employing fewer
than twenty-five employees. 8 Legislative history indicates that a
policy defining employers by the number of employees working
over a period of time was intended to limit coverage to those
employing entities which have a significant impact on interstate
commerce.'9 This policy was also intended to further limit coverage to those workplaces where close and intimate personnel relationships are of less consequence. 0
Parallel to the role of the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") in enforcing the NLRA,2' the Fair Employment Practice
Commission ("FEPC") - under later versions, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") - was to be empowered
with the authority to enforce the provisions of the fair employment
law. Enforcement was contemplated through the issuance of
"cease and desist" orders, subject to only limited judicial review.'
The agency would have authority to investigate and charge an employer with discrimination, and to hold hearings and issue enforce-

13. See Fair Employment, supra note 4, at 431-32, 466; Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1317.

14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
See Employment Discrimination, supra [ote 8, at 1196 n.7.
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(e) to 2000e(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 401(c) (1988) (referring to the impact of labor unrest on the free flow of commerce).
18. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, sec. 701(b), § 2000e(b), 78 Stat. 241,
253. The Act now exempts entities employing fewer than fifteen employees. 42 U.S.C. §
15.

2000e(b) (1988).
19. See Carl Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM.

L. REV. 473, 474 (1966) (citing 110 CONG. REc. S13,088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
20. See id. at 474. However, the additional requirement mandating that the employer
have the requisite number of workers for at least twenty calendar weeks of the current or
preceding year was added specifically to exempt small seasonal employers. Francis J. Vaas,
Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431, 447 (1966).
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988).

22. See Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1315.
23.

See Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1315; Vaas, supra note 20, at 435.
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able orders upon a finding of discrimination. 4 In conjunction with
this broad enforcement authority, these agencies were also given

incidental authority "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as would effectuate the policies of the Act."
By the time the equal employment opportunity provision
emerged from the full committee in the House, however, the
EEOC was left with little enforcement power, other than the au-

thority to institute civil actions in federal court, provided that voluntary efforts at conciliation were unsuccessful.' The proffered
explanation for this change was that the majority of the Judiciary

Committee preferred that the federal judiciary, because of its perceived ability to provide a swifter and fairer resolution of allega-

tions of discrimination, make the ultimate determination of discrimination." Inherent in this explanation was also a fear that the

EEOC would adopt requirements for the racial balancing of
businesses' workforces.'s The Senate further curtailed the EEOC's
enforcement authority by leaving it with only the power to effect
voluntary compliance with the statute.29 As a result, in cases
where the EEOC determined discrimination existed and where

voluntary compliance efforts were unsuccessful, the aggrieved party
was given authority to file suit in federal court."0
Despite this major shift in the basic enforcement mechanism
of Title VII, little consideration was given to redrafting the Act's

24. Vaas, supra note 20, at 435; see also Employment Discrimination, supra note 8, at
1196 n.7.
25. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 12 (1963) [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 914], reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2405.
26. See Vaas, supra note 20, at 436; Kotkin, supra note 4. at 1315. H.R. REP. No. 405,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), which is considered the predecessor to Title VII, provided for
administrative agency enforcement akin to that of the NLRA as originally introduced. However, opposition to an independent commission led the full Judiciary Committee to significantly
alter the agency's enforcement powers. See Vaas, supra note 20, at 433, 435-36. The text of
House Report 405 was amended by H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), submitted by the House Committee on Education and Labor, which substituted the text of House
Report 570 for that of House Report 405. See H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., IstSess. 1
(1963) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 570].
27. See Vaas, supra note 20, at 436.
28. H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 25, pt. 2, at 29; Vaas, supra note 20, at 437. See
Employment Discrimination, supra note 8, at 1196 n.8.
29. See 110 CONG. REc. S12,811 (1964); Vaas, supra note 20, at 452. The Senate
amendments also limited enforcement suits in federal court to cases involving intentional
discrimination. Vaas, supra note 20, at 453.
30. 110 CONG. REc. S12,814. See Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1316.
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remedial scheme to coincide with the new private enforcement
policy." The EEOC's originally proposed authority to issue "cease
and desist" orders, with incidental power to order other appropriate

affirmative action, was merely converted to a provision authorizing
a court that finds intentional discrimination to issue injunctions and

order appropriate action.32 Thus, although the responsibility of enforcement was shifted to the shoulders of private individuals, the
remedy conceived in conjunction with public agency enforcement
was all that was granted. Given the immense costs of enforcement
for private individuals, the remedies of injunction, reinstatement,
and backpay were in many cases wholly inadequate.33 It was unrealistic for many victims of discrimination to shoulder the psycho-

logical and economic burdens of challenging discrimination where
relief was limited to actual salary loss and orders for the employer
to hire or promote and cease the discriminatory practices. This
scheme ignores the psychological harm caused by discrimination
and the risk to reputation, psyche, and the out of pocket costs of
challenging an adverse employment action.'
This shortcoming in Title VII's remedial provisions was immediately reviewed by commentators, many of whom advocated
that the courts grant more expansive relief.3" It was argued that
31. See Fair Employment, supra note 4, at 466; Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1316.
32. Compare H.R. RFP. No. 570, supra note 26, at 11 (stating the Equal Opportunity
Board "shall . . . issue a cease and desist order" if it finds an employer engaged in an unlawful employment practice) (emphasis added) with H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 25, at 12
(stating that a court "may enjoin [the employer] from engaging in . . . unlawful employment
practice[s]" and may order the employer to redress the plaintiff through, inter alia, backpay
andlor reinstatement) (emphasis added); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88352, see. 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261. Furthermore, any award of backpay was to be diminished
by the amount of interim earnings. Id.
33. See Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 54 VA. L.
REv. 491, 492-93 (1968) [hereinafter Tort Remedies]. The author notes that backpay is often
not significant, especially once any interim earnings are deducted. Furthermore, before a discrimination complaint is resolved, an aggrieved party is likely to have found other work, or
would in general find reinstatement unappealing. Finally, the remedy provided ignores the loss
of opportunity and psychological damages caused by the discrimination. Id.; see also Kotkin,
supra note 4, at 1317-20. By distinguishing between the intent of the NLRA in preserving
industrial peace and the unitary intent of Title VII in protecting individuals from discrimination, Kotkin justifies the NLRA's failure to afford full compensation. Kotkin, supra note 4, at
1317-20. See also Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 401 F. Supp. 1022, 1044-45 (E.D. La.
1975), aFd in pertinent part, 583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934
(1979) (distinguishing between Title VII and the NLRA by noting that the intent of the
NLRA was to provide a framework for conflict resolution between management and labor
while Title VII was intended to offer relief to victims in all instances of discrimination). Id.
34. See Tort Remedies, supra note 33, at 493.
35. See, e.g., Tort Remedies, supra note 33, at 498-502; Fair Employment, supra note 4,
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tort-like compensatory and punitive damages would be necessary to
adequately encourage enforcement of Title VII by redressing the

full effects of discrimination." In fact, as the interpretation of
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 ("Section 1981") 3'
broadened to provide correlative relief from employment discrimination based on race,"8 the availability of recourse through Section
1981 shielded victims of racial discrimination39 from the acknowledged restrictions in the remedial scheme of Title VII. This is
because Section 1981 has generally been interpreted to provide for
the award of compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination.'

Increasing recognition of the inadequacy of the remedial
scheme under Title VII led to amendment of the Act in 1972."'
Once again, the forces of political compromise prevented full realignment of the relationship between remedy and enforcement. The
original amendment proposal, which would have given the EEOC
authority to issue cease and desist orders was, in the end, eliminated in favor.of the less controversial provision granting the agency

at 466-68 n.3.
36. Tort Remedies, supra note 33, at 498-99.
37. Acts of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 28 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
38. See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (recognizing that another section of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, Section 1982, reached purely private acts of discrimination); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (affirming lower federal courts'
analogous application of Section 1981 to race discrimination by private employers).
39. Subsequent interpretations of Section 1981 extended its coverage to some victims of
discrimination on the basis of national origin. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng'g,
Inc., 597 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1979).
40. Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1348.
41. The Senate Report on the 1972 amendments noted:
The most striking deficiency of the 1964 Act is that the EEOC does not have the
authority to issue judicially enforceable orders to back up its findings of discrimination ....
As a consequence, unless the Department of Justice concludes that a pattern
or practice of resistance to Title VII is involved, the burden of obtaining enforceable relief rests upon each individual victim of discrimination, who must go into
court as a private party, with the delay and expense that entails, in order to secure
the rights promised him under the law.
S. RFP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971). See General Tel. Co., Inc. v. EEOC, 446
U.S. 318, 325 n.7 (1980); see also Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1321 (citing H.R. REP. No. 238,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1971)).
The House Committee also observed that less than half of the charges filed with the
EEOC were satisfactorily resolved, leaving more than half of allcomplainants the choice of
going to court or foregoing any remedy for discrimination. See Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1321
(citing H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1971)).
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authority to bring suit for violations of the law.42 While the
EEOC's authority to institute federal suits relieved some aggrieved
parties of this burden, 3 it failed to address the other deficiencies
attributable to the limited relief available to private litigants. Again,
individuals suffering from discrimination on the basis of sex or
religion were largely left with the responsibility of vindicating the
public's interest in non-discrimination without the ability to also

obtain full compensation for their own personal injuries." Other
relevant changes wrought by the amendments included provisions
for the appointment of an attorney, the waiver of fees for individuals pursuing litigation and authority for an enforcing court to grant
"any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."'45 Significantly, the scope of this additional authority was never debated,
other than to note that it would allow the courts "wide discretion"
to fashion "the most complete relief possible."'
More recent commentary addressed the persisting need for expanded remedies under Title VII, but again also advocated a flexible approach by the federal judiciary in fashioning more comprehensive remedies under the existing statutory scheme. Indeed, in
1991 Congress finally adopted tort-like damages for individual
victims in cases of intentional discrimination.48 Through amend-

42. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Kotkin, supra
note 4, at 1320-25.
43. Obviously, if the EEOC does not see merit in the charge, or declines to pursue
court action for any other reason, the individual complainant must still initiate suit or forego
resolution of the complaint.
44. Despite a widespread impression that there is an explosion of employment discrimination claims, there is a very low rate (approximately one percent) of litigation by people
who feel that they have suffered employment discrimination. In fact, there are more than
twice as many personal injury cases as opposed to employment discrimination cases filed in
federal courts. See Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEO. LJ. 1659,
1679-80 (1991).
45. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 4, §§
2000e-5(f), 5(g), 86 Stat. 103, 107 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f), 5(g) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)). Concerns were also raised regarding the financial impact of the litigation of
discrimination complaints on small businesses. An amendment was proposed that would have
provided for full or partial payment by the federal government of the reasonable expenses
and attorneys' fees of small (25-100 employees) and very small (less than 25 employees)
businesses proceeded against under the Act. See 118 CONG. REC. S671 (1972).
46. Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1325.
47. See Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1371-73.
48. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 102, § 1981a, 105 Stat.
1071, 1072 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993)).
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ments in 1991, in order to "legislatively overrule" a number of

limiting interpretations of Title VII and Section 1981 by the Supreme Court, Congress significantly expanded the remedies available under Title VII to more adequately compensate victims and
deter unlawful discrimination." The 1990 legislation, passed by
Congress but vetoed by then-President George Bush, provided for
the award of compensatory and punitive damages to victims of

intentional discrimination with the amount of punitive damages
limited to the greater of the amount of (1) compensatory damages
plus backpay or (2) $150,000.50 The 1991 proposed amendments,
which were eventually passed and signed into law, imposed a

series of incremental caps on the amount of compensatory and
punitive damages that may be awarded to a complaining party
depending upon the number of respondent's employees.5" This

imposition of caps was again the result of political compromise.
Largely in response to intense lobbying efforts by representatives
of business entities, some members of Congress expressed grave
concern that the potential damage liability would particularly threaten small businesses, thereby potentially jeopardizing a significant
source of tax revenue and jobs across the nation. 2 Other members
of Congress opposed the caps because they wanted to equalize the

recovery available to victims of sex or religious discrimination
under Title VII with the recovery available to victims of race or
national origin discrimination under Section 1981.' 3 The debate

over the issue of capping damage awards thus centered on the

49. Id. at 1071-74, 1079 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981a, 1988 (Supp. V 1993)).
For an expanded discussion of the 1990-1991 process of amending Title VII, see Janice R.
Franke, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Remedial Civil Rights Policies Prevail, 17 S. ILL. U.
L.. 267 (1993).
50. H.R. REP. No. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990). Compensatory damages - not
including backpay and interest thereon - could be awarded to any victim of intentional discrimination, and punitive damages could be awarded where a non-governmental respondent
acted with malice or reckless indifference to the plaintiff's federally protected rights. Id. This
section also provided that any party in a case where compensatory or punitive damages were
sought could demand a jury trial. Id.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) (Supp. V 1993).
52. See 137 CONG. RE. H3040 (daily ed. May 15, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Paxon); 137
CONG. REc. H3808 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Ireland); 137 CONG. RE.
H3727 (daily ed. May 30, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Mink); 137 CONG. REc. H3858 (daily ed.
June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Lent).
53. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H9526-27 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (remarks of Rep.
Edwards); 137 CONG. RaE. H3883 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Schroeder); 137
CONG. REC. H3889 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Morella); 137 CONG. RE.
H3891 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Lowey).
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existence of caps rather than the incremental link between the size
of the employer and the amount of damages recoverable.'
II.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE

IssuE OF PERSONAL

LABILrrY UNDER TITLE VII

Early litigation under Title VII raised issues about the scope
of relief available to victims of discrimination, including questions
about the types of remedies available as well as the individuals or
entities from whom relief could be obtained. Courts disagreed as to
whether Title VII authorized the award of compensatory damages
for the "psychic" injuries suffered as a result of discrimination and
whether Title VII authorized punitive damages to further the remedial purposes of the statute.55 While the authority to award compensatory and punitive damages was derived from an interpretation
of the statutory authority to award "other appropriate relief," those
courts allowing recovery of such damages based their decisions
largely on policy considerations. 6 The policy rationale articulated
focused on the encouragement of full compensation. Because the
responsibility for "prosecution" of illegal employment discrimination claims was placed on the shoulders of private plaintiffs cast
into the role of "private attorneys general," it was argued that more
vigorous enforcement would be encouraged if full compensation for

54. The tiered cap system was introduced in conjunction with one of several unsuccessful amendments offered during the amendment process, and it was incorporated into the final
version of the law without direct comment. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 102-40, 102d Cong., Ist
Sess., pt. 1, at 74, 112-13, 142-44, pt. 2, at 24-29, 68-74 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 612, 650-51, 671-73, 717-23, 754-60; see also 137 CONG. REc. S7024
(daily ed. June 4, 1991). This proposal provided for the recovery of compensatory damages
where the plaintiff demonstrated clear and convincing evidence of an injury requiring compensation. It also authorized the court to assess an equitable civil penalty against the defendant
to be used for public anti-discrimination activities. The idea actually had its genesis in President Bush's 1991 amendment proposal wherein he proposed additional equitable relief in
cases of sexual harassment, with a provision for the court to determine whether to award
such relief after considering, inter alia, the employer's size and the effect of the award on
the economic viability of the employer. 137 CONG. REc. S3022-23 (daily ed. March 12,
1991); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
55. See Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 401 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. La. 1975), aff'd
in pertinent part, 583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979) (allowing

either compensatory or punitive damages); Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co.,
369 F. Supp. 832, 838 (W.D. Tex. 1973); cf Alexander v. Consolidated Freightways Co.,
421 F. Supp. 450, 451 (D. Colo. 1976); Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D.
Neb. 1972) (holding that neither compensatory nor punitive damages are allowed).
56. See, e.g., Claiborne, 401 F. Supp. at 1024; Humphrey, 369 F. Supp. at 835.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

9

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

an individual's injury was available.'

[Vol. 12:1

It was noted that the great-

est injury resulting from discrimination - namely, the loss of selfrespect or sense of achievement from performing one's job - may
far outweigh the actual salary loss." Thus, allowing punitive dam-

ages or other recovery for psychic injuries, to provide additional
relief for the uncompensated losses suffered by victims of discrimination, was deemed necessary to further the broad remedial aims of
the statute.59 Courts authorizing these types of damages, however,

were in the minority and, prior to the 1991 amendments, the
statute's remedies have been interpreted as limited to compensation
for backpay and other equitable relief.6'
H.

TITLE

VII PROVISIONS PRIOR TO THE 1991 AMENDMENTs

The question of potential Title VII liability for defendants in
their individual capacities involves both legal and policy considerations. In contemplating these considerations, the major focus is on
the plain language of the statute. The anti-discrimination provisions
of Title VII pertain to "employers," defined as persons and their
agents engaged in an industry affecting commerce." Several
courts have interpreted this language as directly placing those indi-

viduals engaged in discriminatory job actions, while acting for a
covered employer, within the ambit of the statute's remedial provisions.62 These courts have further interpreted the size requirement

of fifteen or more employees as applicable only in defining statuto-

ry coverage of the employing entity.63 Where both the employing

57.
58.

Humphrey, 369 F. Supp. at 835.
Id. at 834.

59. See Claiborne, 401 F. Supp. at 1025; Humphrey, 369 F. Supp. at 835.
60. Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986); Harrington v.
Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932
(1979).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). The definition also requires that the employer have at
least fifteen employees working each work day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding year. Id.
62. See, e.g., Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in
part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); David v. Apfel, Levy, Zlotnick & Co., No. 91 Civ. 3384,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8643, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1993); Anderson v. Phelps, 655 F.
Supp. 560, 562 (M.D. La. 1985); Hanshaw v. Delaware Tech. & Community College, 405 F.
Supp. 292, 295-96 (D. Del. 1975).
63. See Hanshaw, 405 F. Supp. at 295. In a later case, a court responded to the argument that Congress' exemption for small businesses implies that a similar exemption was
intended for individuals. See Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F. Supp. 526, 528
(D.N.H. 1993). The court opined that there is no support for the proposition that Congress
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entity and an individual employee agent are found liable under the
Title VII, courts generally have imposed joint and several liabili-

ty.' In most of these cases, the inquiry focuses on whether the
individual employee exercised sufficient control over decisions
affecting the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment to be
deemed the employer's agent under common law agency principles.' In some cases, the individual defendant has been found to
be essentially the alter ego of the employing entity, thereby fitting
squarely into the concept of employer.'
These courts, in addition to relying on the "plain language" '67
of the statutory definition, have justified their interpretation of the
statute's coverage on policy grounds. First, they argue that the
remedial provisions of Title VII should be broadly construed to

effect the Act's purpose in compensating victims of unlawful discrimination and deterring such discrimination.'

This liberal inter-

was protecting small businesses on the basis of size, as opposed to the alternative explanation
that Congress intended to protect family operated businesses that might be accused of bias in
hiring family and friends. Id. This contention was later rejected in Smith v. Capitol City
Club, 850 F. Supp. 976, 979 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
64. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 702 (2d Cir. 1994); EEOC v.
Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that while there is no general right of
contribution under Title VII, a court can order contribution among the parties actually named
as defendants in a Title VII suit); Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 1986).
The Fifth Circuit later implied that Hamilton is nonauthoritative on the issue of personal
liability of agents. Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28, n.2 (5th Cir. 1990); see also
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1527 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
65. See, e.g., Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104; Lamirande, 834 F. Supp. at 529; Vakharia v.
Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 784-85 (N.D. Il. 1993); Bridges v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Many courts emphasize the distinction between employees who have a personal or
active involvement in discrimination and those who are merely following an institutional
policy set by supervisors or the employing entity, assessing personal liability only against
those in the former category. See Paroline, 879 F.2d at 106; Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 78485; Hendrix v. Fleming Co., 650 F. Supp. 301, 303 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
With the extension of Title VII's coverage to state and municipal employees and educational institutions under the 1972 amendments, another issue arose as to whether public
officials can be held personally liable for violations of the Act. Here again, courts split on
resolution of this issue. See Clanton v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d 1084, 1099 (5th
Cir. Unit A July 1981) (finding that no authority existed to hold public officials personally
liable under Title VII); f~ Packard v. Hopkins, No. HAR-90-1391, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3630, at *7-8 (D. Md. Mar. 21, 1991) (holding that public officials can be held personally
liable for Title VII violations).
66. See, e.g., Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Walner & Assoc., 835 F. Supp. 459, 461-62
(N.D. I11.
1993); Ruich v. Ruff, Weidenaar & Reidy, Ltd., 837 F. Supp. 881, 884 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
67. See, e.g., Lamirande, 834 F. Supp. at 529.
68. See Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 785.
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pretation of Title VII requires persons who exercise control over
terms and conditions of employment to be held directly responsible
for their actions.69 Failure to allow recourse against these individuals practicing discrimination decreases the deterrence goal and

may hold harmless those who have engaged in "active" misconduct.7° Further, instances may arise where the employing entity
goes bankrupt and the only avenue for recovery is against the discriminating agents,7 or where the employer does not accurately

identify and punish the individual employee agents who have en-

gaged in discriminatory conduct. 2
In contrast, other courts have relied on the doctrine of respondeat superior to justify including agents within the statutory definition of "employer."7 3 Using this analysis, the employee agents are
liable only in their official capacities. 4 These courts have relied
on two factors. First, the statutory definition exempts employers
with fewer than 15 employees. 5 It is asserted that because of this

exemption, it is inconsistent to protect small employers from liability under Title VII but not to extend similar protection to individual employees. 6 Second, these courts rely on the types of
damages generally available under Title VII prior to the 1991
amendments because these damages - namely injunctions, reinstatement, and backpay - are most appropriately awarded against
an employing entity 7 Furthermore, when an employee is acting

69. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1527 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
see also Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442; Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 785.
70. See Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443; Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1527.
71. See, e.g., EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1988). In Vucitech, a company
with a discriminatory policy regarding maternity benefits was sold, went bankrupt and was
started again as a new entity by a group of former owners and employees. Id.
72. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571, 577, motion for new
trial denied, No. 92 C 7330, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15025 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 1993).
73. Notably, courts within the same district have come to opposite conclusions on this
issue. Carlson v. Northwestern Univ., 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 797, 799 (N.D. Ill.
April 13, 1994). See Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 784 (holding that employee agents are liable
only in their official capacity); cf Pelech v. Klaff-Joss, LP, 828 F. Supp. 525, 529 (N.D. I11.
1993) (upholding liability against employee agents in their individual capacity).
74. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993); Harvey v. Blake,
913 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 844 F. Supp.
466, 468-69 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
76. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
77. See, e.g., Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982); Pelech, 828 F.
Supp. at 529.
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as an agent of the employer, he or she is merely a surrogate for
the employer and thus should only be liable in that representative
capacity." Since the employing entity will be liable for the actions of its employees, it is argued that the strong deterrent effect
would remain, i.e., no employer will maintain employees who have
exposed it to liability for significant civil damages.79
IV. TITLE VII PROviSIONS AFTER THE 1991 AMENDMENTS
The significant change engendered by the 1991 amendments
relative to the issue of personal liability for employee agent defendants was the addition of a provision authorizing the award of
compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination." Several courts found this additional remedy pivotal in
the determination of whether damages could be awarded against
individual employee agents.8 In Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co.,'
the court noted that a basic rationale for declining to impose personal liability on employee agents is undercut by the authorization
of tort-like damages, since they are traditionally awarded against
individuals.83 In fact, under basic principles of tort law, liability
for compensatory damages rests primarily with the wrongdoer. This
is true although respondeat superior may offer an alternative avenue for recovering the damages from the wrongdoer's employer.'
Liability for punitive damages, on the other hand - which generally cannot be collected from an employer - rests exclusively with
the individual wrongdoer or one who has acquiesced in the offending conduct. 5
However, as noted earlier, the provision authorizing both com-

78. Pelech, 828 F. Supp. at 529.
79. See, e.g., Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (D.NJ.
1994).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993).
81. See, e.g., Williams v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. 93 CIV. 5491, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 335, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1994); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., No. 92
C 7330, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15025, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 1993); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 785 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Hangebrauck v. Deloitte &
Touche, No. 92 C 3328, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17506 (N.D. II. Nov. 5, 1992); Bridges v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
82. 800 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
83. Id. at 1180.
84.

See, e.g., STUART M. SPEIsER Er AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §§ 4:1, 4:3

(1983).
85. Id. § 8:50.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

13

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 12:1

pensatory and punitive damages imposed a series of caps on the
amount of such damages, tying those caps to the size of the offending individual's employer. 6 Because of this link to the employing entity's size, some courts have been unwilling to interpret
these damage provisions as applicable against defendants in their
personal capacities.' Again, it is argued that since Congress elected to limit the burdens of complying with Title VII to employers
with at least fifteen employees, Congress could not have intended
to impose those burdens on individuals. 8 Moreover, the argument
goes, the failure to include single individuals among the list of
damage caps implies that individuals were not envisioned to pay
these damages.8 9 Congress' failure to amend the definition of employer to specifically include individuals or to eliminate the exemption for small employers, in light of the numerous decisions declining to impose personal liability on employee agents, also cuts
against imposition of personal liability under the amendments.'
One court has pointed out some practical problems with the imposition of individual liability under the existing scheme.' First,
because the damage caps are linked to the size of the employer,
employee agents found guilty of discrimination will have varying
liability exposures depending upon the size of their workplace.
Second, it is unclear whether the current system of caps envisions
separate applicability to the employer and an employee agent as
opposed to some apportionment of the applicable cap amount between the employer and an employee agent. Third, in the situation
where damages are awarded against more than one employee agent,
it is not clear whether the cap applies to the total award, or to the
award against each separate defendant.'

86. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) (Supp. V 1993). The limits on the sum of compensatory and punitive damages awarded for each complaining party range from $50,000 to

$300,000. Id. The lesser amount applies to cases where the respondent has between 15 and
100 employees while the greater amount applies to cases where the respondent has greater
than 500 employees. Id.
87. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994); Smith v. Capitol City Club, 850 F. Supp. 976, 981
(M.D. Ala. 1994).
88. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
89. Id. at 587-88 n.2.
90. Smith, 850 F. Supp. at 980.
91. Id.
92. Ld. However, even in light of such perceived problems, this court noted that an
exception to the rule against individual liability may exist where denial of such liability could
affect the plaintiff's opportunity to recover damages (e.g., where the employing entity goes
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Contrary to the concerns expressed, however, at least two
courts have had no problem applying the stepwise damage cap
system in situations where the employing entity and individual
defendants shared liability for discrimination.' In EEOC v. AIC
Sec. Investigations, Ltd.,94 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that the only entities specifically excluded under the statutory language regarding damage caps are governments, government agencies and political subdivisions. 95 Since the
statutory language defines the damage caps in terms of "each complaining party," the court reasoned that the applicable limits describe the aggregate amount of damages that the complaining party
may recover from whichever defendants are found liable. 96 When
faced with apportioning the damage award between the employer
and individual defendants, that court declared the award to be joint
and several in light of the fact that the jury had assessed equal
amounts (though amounts in excess of the statutory cap) against
both defendants.' Similarly, the Second Circuit recently upheld a
trial court's award of Title VII compensatory damages against the
employing entity and four individuals jointly and severally. 98
V. PERSONAL LIABILITY UNDER RELATED

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
It is instructive to examine the issue of personal liability under
related employment anti-discrimination laws, particularly analyzing
the policy considerations which may argue for similar or different
treatment of the various provisions. The statutes most apt for comparison are Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 9, the

bankrupt or where it is necessary to pierce the corporate veil to reach assets of the individual
owners or managers). Id. at 981.
93. See Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 702 (2d Cir. 1994); EEOC v. AIC Sec.
Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571, 575-80, motion for new trial denied, No. 92 C 7330,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15025 (N.D. 1l. Oct. 20, 1993).
94. 823 F. Supp. 571, motion for new trial denied, No. 92 C 7330, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15025 (N.D. III. Oct. 20, 1993).
95. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. at 577.

96. Id. The court noted that this view, although contrary to the plaintiffs contentions,
comports with the EEOC's policy guidelines which provide that the sliding scale of damage
caps applies to each aggrieved party. Id. at 576.
97. Id. at 579.
98. Cornwell, 23 F.3d at 702.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), t °

and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"); 0 ' in
fact, the latter two are modeled after Title VII to extend protection

against employment discrimination on the basis of age and disability respectively.
Section 1981 grants to all persons the same right to make and
enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens."°c This grant
has been interpreted to prohibit race discrimination in both public
The basis for a cause of action for
and private employment.'
race discrimination in employment under Title VII is coextensive

with the basis for the same claim under Section 1981."° Section
1981 provides for both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and - under certain circumstances - punitive damages. 5 Liability, however, depends upon a finding that the discrim-

ination was intentional,"°e but this section contains no statutorily
imposed size limits regarding its application. Section 1981 has been
widely interpreted and applied to allow the award of damages

100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
103. The Supreme Court confirmed that Section 1981 applies to discrimination by private
employers and labor unions in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975). The courts have deemed Section 1981 to apply only to discrimination based on race
and to some claims of discrimination based on national origin. See Bobo v. ITT, Continental
Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (holding Section 1981 inapplicable to claims
of sex discrimination); Barkley v. Carraux, 533 F. Supp. 242 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding Section 1981 inapplicable to claims of age discrimination); Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F. Supp. 302
(W.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding Section 1981 inapplicable to claims of discrimination based on
religion). However, claims have been allowed based on national origin where there is a racial
nature to the claim. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng'g, Inc., 597 F.2d 1298 (9th
Cir. 1979) (upholding Section 1981 claim where Mexican-American alleged discrimination was
linked to brown skin).
The courts have also applied Section 1981 to all aspects of the employment contract
relationship, including recruitment, hiring, compensation, assignment, promotion, layoff, and
discharge. See, e.g., Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1978). In
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the Supreme Court limited the
application of Section 1981 by interpreting it very narrowly, extending protection only to the
formation of contracts and access to legal process for the enforcement of contracts. Id. at
176-78. However, Congress amended the law in conjunction with the 1991 Title VII amendments, explicitly stating that Section 1981 provides protection in the "making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms,
and conditions of the contractual relationship." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (Supp. V 1993)).
104. See Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1348.
105. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460.
106. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
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against individual employee agents of an employer, at least against
those who have had personal involvement in the discriminatory
action. 7
The provisions of the ADEA were largely modeled after those
of Title VII. The substantive prohibitions against discrimination are
essentially the same, as is the definition of employer to include
persons and agents thereof operating businesses of a certain
size. '° Unlike Title VI1, however, the remedial provisions of the
ADEA incorporate the remedial scheme of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")' and offers a broader scope of relief." ° It
authorizes the grant of appropriate legal or equitable relief, and
provides for liquidated damages in cases of willful violations of
Title VII."

Some courts, focusing on the exemption for small employers
and other similarities between Title VII and the ADEA, have declined to recognize claims against employee agents in their individual capacities under either statute."' Similarly, those courts that

have interpreted Title VII as authorizing such personal liability
claims have extended their reasoning to include age discrimination
claims against individuals under the ADEA."' Still other courts
have analyzed the differences between the remedial provisions of
Title VII and the ADEA in the context of personal liability, opin-

ing that the availability of other remedies, particularly punitive type
107. See, e.g., Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1006
(1975); Johnson v. Resources for Human Dev., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Pa. 1994);
Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Il. 1993); Harvey v. NYRAC,
Inc., 813 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Kolb v. Ohio, 721 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ohio 1989);
Anderson v. Phelps, 655 F. Supp. 560 (M.D. La. 1985); Weaver v. Gross, 605 F. Supp. 210
(D.D.C. 1985); Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 604 F. Supp. 229 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Bennett v.
Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md.), affid, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 917 (1972).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The ADEA exempts from coverage
employers with fewer than twenty employees and prohibits discrimination based on age, as
opposed to race, national origin, religion, or sex.
109. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
110. 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(b), 216, 217 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). See House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 16061 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
112. See, e.g., Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1405-06 (N.D. I11. 1994);
Dunham v. City of O'Fallon, No. 4:93CV02677, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6441, at *3-5 (E.D.
Mo. May 12, 1994); Violanti v. Emery Worldwide ACF Co., 847 F. Supp. 1251, 1256 (M.D.
Pa. 1994).
113. See, e.g., Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 858 F. Supp. 802 (C.D. 111. 1994);
Deluca v. Winer Indus., 857 F. Supp. 606, summary judgment granted, No. 93 C 6535, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9467 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 1994).
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damages based on willful misconduct under the ADEA, argues for
imposition of liability directly upon the wrongdoer under the
ADEA. n4 Furthermore, they reasoned that the ADEA's incorporation of the remedies and procedures of the FLSA indicates congressional intent to hold agents personally liable under the ADEA." '

Analysis of personal liability under the ADA has consistently
focused on the definition of "covered entities" or "employers"
Several courts have upheld liaunder the ADA and Title VII.

bility against employee agents in their individual capacities based
on various interpretations of Title VII as authorizing such personal
liability claims."' Some of these reasons include: (1) the availability of compensatory and punitive damages under the acts as
amended;"' (2) the need to ensure compensation to victims of
discrimination and to deter future discrimination;".9 and (3) a rejection of the relevance of a distinction between official and indi-

vidual capacity under the acts. 2 ' An additional reason for similar

treatment of these statutes is the fact that the 1991 amendments to
the Civil Rights Act authorizing compensatory and punitive damag-

es in Title VII and ADA cases were treated together in one provision."
Policy considerations similarly dictate that all of these statutes
should be coextensive in reach. There is no basis for different
treatment of claims of race discrimination under Section 1981 and
claims of discrimination based on race and other protected classes
114. See, e.g., Elias v. Sitomer, No. 91 Civ. 8010, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18627, at *1112 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1992). Of course, now that such damages are specifically available
under Title VII, this argument supports recognition of Title VII's authority to award damages
against defendants in their individual capacities.
115. See id.; House, 713 F. Supp. at 160-61; see also Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991
F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1993) (Fletcher, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
116. See, e.g., Dunham, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6441, at *4-5; Doe v. Shapiro, 852 F.
Supp. 1246, 1252 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Deluca, 857 F. Supp. at 607; EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., No. 92 C 7330, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15025, at *19 (N.D. Il1. Oct. 20,
1993).
117. See, e.g., Deluca, 857 F. Supp. at 607-08. But see Dunham, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6441, at *4-5 (dismissing Title VII claims against municipal employees in their individual
capacities).
118. A1C Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15025, at *20-21.
119. Id. at *27-29.
120. Shapiro, 852 F. Supp. at 1252-53. In Shapiro, the court contrasted 42 U.S.C. § 1983
with Title VII and the ADA. While section 1983 distinguishes between official and individual
capacity by requiring that the person charged with a violation act under color of state law,
Title VII and the ADA only require that the defendant is an employer of the plaintiff in
order to be liable under the provisions of these statutes. Id.
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993).
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under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA, particularly where the
same conduct gives rise to a claim of race discrimination under
Title VII and Section 1981. Even the proffered reason for exempting individuals, as in keeping with the exemption for small em-

ployer entities, pales in light of the fact that those same individuals
can be personally liable for acts of race discrimination under Section 1981." Individual defendants should face the same liability
for all acts of discrimination." Certainly the victims of discrimi-

nation should be afforded similar opportunity to receive full compensation for injuries suffered as a result of any such discrimination." Furthermore, even if a difference in available remedies

under the various statutes was a valid reason for recognizing different classes of defendants under the statutes prior to 1991, the damage provisions of the 1991 amendments of Title VII and the ADA

vitiate that justification.
VI. PERSONAL LiABILrrY FOR EMPLOYEE AGENTS
UNDER TITLE VII IS APPROPRIATE

The case law on the issue of personal liability for employee

agents under Title VII is far from consistent. In many cases it involves little real legal analysis or appropriate policy considerations.

Courts within federal districts have come to various conclusions as
to whether such claims against individual defendants are authorized. " Of the six Circuit Courts of Appeal that have addressed
the issue, only the Ninth Circuit, in Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l,
Inc.," has independently commented at any length on the rea-

122. See supra text accompanying note 107. Also note that the same argument holds true
for the small employer entity - it too is potentially subject to liability under Section 1981.
123. See Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 785 (N.D. I11.1993).
124. The goal of amending Title VII to allow for the recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages was to achieve parity in the treatment of victims of discrimination based on
sex, religion, and disability, under Title VII and the ADA, and victims of race discrimination
under Section 1981 in the context of a plaintiff's ability to recover such damages. See 137
CONG. REC. H3883 (remarks of Rep. Schroeder), H3889 (remarks of Rep. Morella), H3891
(remarks of Rep. Lowey) (daily ed. June 4, 1991). Controversy over the potential impact of
such damage awards, however, led to the imposition of damage caps under Title VII and the
ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993), but not under Section 1981. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
125. See, e.g., Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1405 (N.D. Ill. 1994);
Johnson v. Northern Ind. Public Serv. Co., 844 F. Supp. 466, 468-69 (N.D. Ind. 1994). Both
cases acknowledge the split among courts of the Northern District of Illinois.
126. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cit. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

19

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 12:1

sons for its position. 27 The other circuits have either specifically

relied upon the reasoning in Miller or have summarily taken a
position that personal liability is or is not appropriate under the
29
Act; 2 1 three circuits have decided on each side of the issue.
Additionally, several district court cases have been decided on

issues tangential to personal liability 3 ' or with a cursory accep-

tance of a similar ruling in another non-precedential case.'
At least part of the reason why courts have had difficulty with
this issue must be attributed to the effects of the compromise posi-

tions taken both in the initial enactment and subsequent amendments to Title VII. Structurally, much of the original and amended
Act was derived during the debate process, at times without due
consideration of the effects of some of the changes adopted. Consequently, there are some apparently anomalous provisions in the
Act, especially regarding issues of enforcement and remedies.'

127. Id. at 587-89.
128. See Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding joint and several
liability against the employing entity and individuals without any discussion of the appropriateness of personal liability under Title VII); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652-53
(5th Cir. 1994) (relying on Miller to justify its extension of an earlier ruling that a public
official is liable in an official capacity only); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125
(10th Cir. 1993) (holding that an individual acting in a supervisory fashion can only be sued
in a representative capacity); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that an employee agent is only liable for harassment in which he actually participated), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d
1225, 1231 (6th, Cir. 1986) (holding that individuals may clearly be held liable as agents of
an employer under Title VI).
129. See supra notes 127-28.
130. See Williams-Guice v. Board of Educ., No. 92 C 7904, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 944,
at *16-17 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 1994) (dismissal of action based on failure to allege that individual defendants played a role in hiring decisions of employer), afrd, 45 F.3d 161 (7th Cir.
1995); Greene v. Term City, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 584, 586-87 (N.D. Il1. 1993) (dismissal of
action based on failure to name individual defendants in the EEOC complaint); Bertoncini v.
Schrimpf, 712 F. Supp. 1336, 1339-40 (N.D. II. 1989) (Duff, J.) (disposition of action based
on presumption that a named individual is being sued in an official as opposed to a personal
capacity). Notably, the same court later ruled that a claim against a supervisor in his individual capacity should be dismissed because the relief authorized under Title VII was that
which would only be provided by an employer. Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F.
Supp. 407, 411 (N.D. IUl. 1991) (Duff, J.).
131. See, e.g., Timmons v. Lutheran Children & Family Serv., No. 93-4201, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18011, at *13-15 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 1993) (concluding that a majority of circuits, with the exclusion of the Third Circuit, have limited the liability of supervisory personnel to official capacity); David v. Apfel, Levy, Zlotnick & Co., No. 91 Civ. 3384, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8643, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1993) (relying on cases from the Fifth Circuit
and district courts of Tennessee and Rhode Island to declare a supervisor a proper defendant).
132. See Employment Discrimination,supra note 8, at 1112. These anomalies were exacerbated by the 1991 amendments, which imposed a stepwise link between the size of the em-
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As discussed earlier, the compromises which shifted Title
VI's original public enforcement scheme to one which is entirely
dependent upon private lawsuits never included a concomitant
revision of the statute's remedial scheme to specifically permit a
complainant's recovery of compensatory and punitive damages."
The incongruity between enforcement suits directed against individual defendants and the resulting limited remedies of injunction
and backpay is a result of sloppy congressional compromise rather
than congressional intent to limit or deny recovery against individual participants in a discriminatory employment decision. The reasons for defining "employer" by the size of its workforce were
two-fold. First, it was intended to link the reach of the statute to
activity with a palpable effect on interstate commerce."M Second,
it was intended to limit the statute's reach to employment situations that did not involve close personal ties between employer and
employees.'35 There is no compelling reason to interpret this limitation as anything more than a restraint on the reach of federal
legislation imposed by the Commerce Clause and as an exemption
to small, family-operated businesses. Furthermore, the pressures
exerted on Congress to limit the applicability of the Act's provisions based on the size of the employer came from representatives
and advocates of business. Their concerns were that a law providing for excessive damage awards in discrimination suits would:
(1) end the free enterprise system; (2) deprive employers of the
right to basic control over their operations; and (3) risk widespread
loss of jobs and tax revenues as employers faced financial ruin
from damage awards resulting from discrimination suits. 13 6 The
basis for the incremental association between damage awards and
the size of the employing entity in the 1991 amendments was the
concern that the threat to economic viability posed by damage
awards might impact most heavily on small businesses important to
the stimulation of jobs in the weak economy."

ployer and the cap on the amount of compensatory and punitive damages authorized. See
supra text accompanying notes 86-92.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 14-40.
134. See supra text accompanying note 19.
135. See supra text accompanying note 20.
136. See, e.g., 109 CONG. REc. H1518 (1964); 109 CONG. REc. H1604-06 (1964); 137
CONG. REC. H3040 (daily ed. May 15, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. H3725, 3727 (daily ed. May
30, 1991); 137 CONG. REc. H3808, 3834-35 (daily ed. June 4, 1991).
137. A 1991 proposal by President Bush for an amendment to the Civil Rights Act, providing for additional equitable relief in cases of sexual harassment, spelled out considerations
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These concerns about protecting small business entities do not

provide any basis for the argument that Congress similarly intended
to protect individual employee agents. Despite the difficulties created by the ill-considered structure of the damage caps under the

1991 amendments, seemingly ignoring the individual as a defendant, the scheme was obviously designed to limit the potential
damage awards against employing entities rather than individuals.
Consideration of the caps centered on the risk of losing small
businesses due to liability exposure and the basis for the lower step
was simply the lower bound of employer size.' The liability of
individual defendants was not addressed because their liability

exposure was not of concern in crafting this limitation on damage
recovery. In light of the fact that all debate focused on the adoption of damage caps, rather than the incremental link between
specific caps and employer size, this anomaly is more likely the
result of oversight than of a deliberate decision to protect individuals from personal liability.'39
In addition to becoming mired in the difficulties engendered

by the lack of clear indicia of congressional intent, many courts
grappling with the issue of personal liability under Title VII have
ignored general principles guiding the interpretation and application
of federal remedial laws. For example, Title VII, in contrast to

Title H""' of the same act, contains no language declaring that its
listed remedies are intended to be exclusive. 4 ' Without such limitation, even the original statutory authority granting "such affirma-

tive action as may be appropriate" may be interpreted to provide
for a court to undertake in making such an award, including the employer's size and the
effect of the award on the economic viability of the employer. 137 CONG. REC. S3022-23
(daily ed. March 12, 1991). A subsequent Republican compromise offered a separate bill to
provide for damages in cases of intentional discrimination and, for the first time, actually
scaled the damage award amounts to the size of the employer's workforce. 137 CONG. REC.
S7024-26 (daily ed. June 4, 1991).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53. Soon after passage of the 1991 amendments, there was an effort in the Senate (as yet unsuccessful) to remove the series of caps
on compensatory and punitive damage awards under Title VII. See Albert R. Karr, Senate
Panel Votes to End Lid on Damages, WALL ST. J., March 12, 1992, at A3. Removal of the
damage caps would also dispense with the problems for individual liability presented by the
cap structure.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6(b) (1988); Tort Remedies, supra note 33, at 502. Of
course, Title VII also expressly authorizes courts to order "other affirmative action," language
which was later amended to authorize the grant of "any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (1988).
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for an award of tort-like monetary damages where such an award

would be necessary to redress the effects of discrimination. 42
Furthermore, Section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act 143 provides au-

thority for a federal court to supplement the civil rights laws, as
necessary, with state and/or common law in order to furnish "suitable remedies" and "punish offenses against the law."'" The Supreme Court has also recognized the authority of federal courts to
imply remedies for violations of federal remedial statutes.'4 Alternatively, it has been argued that courts could compensate victims
of discrimination for economic harm or make economic restitution

for loss of employment opportunity, "restoring" the plaintiff to the
position he would have occupied but for the discrimination. 1"
This could be accomplished under the rubric of "equitable" relief
with no more stretch of that term than is required to deem backpay
an equitable remedy. 47
Inherent in the idea that the remedies available under Title VII
have always been potentially broader than many courts have recognized is the notion that such relief could be granted against appropriate defendants beyond the employing entity. The nature of these
additional remedies as well as part of the policy motivation for the
award of expanded remedies dictates this result. Because tort law
assigns primary liability to the tortfeasor, with recourse also against
the employer under the principle of respondeat superior, it is logical that imposition of tort-like damages for victims of discrimina-

142. See Tort Remedies, supra note 33, at 498.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
144. Section 1988 provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of this chapter [21] and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are
suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted
to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against the law, the common law, as modified and
charged by the constitution and the statutes of the State wherein the court having
jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of
a criminal nature, in the infliction of the punishment of the party found guilty.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
145. See, e.g., .1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); see also Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
146. Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1371-73.
147. Kotkin, supra note 4, at 1373-74.
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tion would be directed to the individuals involved in the discriminatory act as well as the employer.14 Furthermore, because agency law allows for principal and agent to be joined in an action
resulting from the agent's tortious conduct, 149 it makes sense to
treat both the individual agent acting discriminatorily and the employer as potential defendants.
Finally, other policy considerations also favor this result. The
goals of Title VII - to compensate victims of discrimination and
deter future discriminatory conduct - are better served by holding
those who engage in discrimination directly responsible.'50 Such a
position ensures that victims of discrimination receive the opportunity to seek full redress from all potential liability sources. It also
sends the clearest message that discrimination in employment will
not be tolerated. Furthermore, it actually promotes Congress' goal
of limiting the liability exposure of businesses by enabling them to
share their exposure to liability with the culpable employee
agent.' Additionally, a lack of parity on this issue between the
various employment anti-discrimination laws produces an intoleravictims of discrimination more
ble situation by granting some
52
others.1
than
redress
of
avenues
VII. CONCLUSION
The legislative development of Title VII, through its original
enactment and subsequent amendments, has been characterized by
compromise positions which have had a significant detrimental
impact on courts' attempts to ascertain the intent of Congress in
various provisions of the Act. Of particular note are the remedial
provisions of Title VII, which have been subject to various interpretations and applications in the context of the type of damages
authorized and the classes of defendants against whom relief may
be granted under the Act. The issue of whether Title VII provides
for the award of damages against employee agents in their individual capacities has become renewed in light of the 1991 amend-

148. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
149. See Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 858 F. Supp. 802, 806 (C.D. Il. 1994)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 359c(l) (1957)).
150. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
151. Of course, under joint and several liability businesses are still likely to be the deeper
pocket from which damages are actually collected. However, if an employer can seek contribution from a culpable employee, there could be instances of employer savings.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
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63

ments to Title VII, which specifically authorize the award of tortlike compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional
discrimination. Review of the legislative history of Title VII and its
amendments, comparison to related anti-discrimination laws, recognition of general principles for the interpretation of remedial statutes, and policy considerations all lead to the conclusion that Title
VII does contemplate personal liability for individual employee
agent defendants.
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